STANDARD FORM NO 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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|--|-------------------|----------------|----|---------------------------------------|
| то : STATINTL | eall sign - | DATE: | my | |
| FROM : | 175 - Home Sta. + | ~ Ser No. | | |
| SUBJECT: | BriRE PLO ON WAS | ren & Trop sur | υ. | Ž. |
| edition control | Ops BRIEF ? Dick | <u> </u> | | STATINTL |
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Approved For Release 2003/01/24 : CIA-RDP74B00776R000100130033-0 PROBLEMS ON GF 62-01

| | 1. The problems encountered occurred with flight planning and briefing- | | | | |
|------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| | were due to required flight planning winds arriveing late, then a subsequent change | | | | |
| | in altitude profile by headquarters necessitating replanning. | | | | |
| STATINTL | 2. Initial instructions in the Hq. Ops Order | | | | |
| | range ferry profiles unless higher profile will provide more fuel remaining | | | | |
| | at high cone," (Par B 4). "select best altitude profile according to wx info | | | | |
| | providing no profile exceeds 70,000 feet" (Par E 3). Based on these instructions | | | | |
| | we flight planned for the maximum range cruise climb profile for the first leg | | | | |
| STATINTL | and plus 15 for the second leg. In the GO_NO GO_mass. | | | | |
| STATINTL | directed that both flights be flown at Plus 180 profile. This late | | | | |
| | change plus the wx compling late caused much last minute confusions. | | | | |
| | 3. The following is the schedule of events during this period: | | | | |
| | a. Aircrew schedule | | | | |
| | Pilot briefing scheduled at 2330L | | | | |
| | Prebreathing scheduled at 0045L | | | | |
| | Take off scheduled at 0200L | | | | |
| | b. Weather schedule: REQUESTED RECEIVED BY FLT PLAN | | | | |
| | Enroute winds 2000L 2130L | | | | |
| - ! | Terminals Wx 2400L 2130L | | | | |
| | NOTE: Planning winds arrived one hour and thirty minutes late allowing a | | | | |
| | maximum time of two hours until briefing and \$\frac{4}{3}\$ to take off. Considering the | | | | |
| | necessity for flight planning both the first and second legs, with celestial, | | | | |
| STATINTL 6 | our problems were already begun. questioned his being able to | | | | |
| | complete and check both flight plans and still give them some celestial. We | | | | |
| | had just completed and checked the first leg and run the second leg at 2245L | | | | |
| | (0+45 before briefing) when the Hqs message arrived requiring reaccomplishing | | | | |
| | the flight plans. | | | | |

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|----------|---|
| STATINTL | GO_NO_GO_NO |
| | NOTE: I I re-ran the first leg while worked |
| STATINTL | on the second leg. We started toping the briefing at 0025 LCL and completed |
| STATINTL | 0045L was approx 5 min. late on the hose). Immediately after re- |
| STATINTL | ceipt of the message I called the District phone number. |
| STATINTL | the phone and informed me that all operations personnel had just gone home. |
| STATINTL | He call and tried to relay info. but this proved unsatisfory so |
| STATINTL | called me. He finally agreed that we had a problem but was reluctant to |
| | make a decision. Telecon ended with his stating that if I was positive our |
| | profile was as good or better than the +18 to go ahead and fly it. Since |
| | we had to flight plan it anyhow to find out for sure we went ahead and flew |
| ň | the +18. Comparis on is as follows: |
| | MAX RANGE PROF +18 PROFILE |
| | Enroute to Hi Cone 8+06 7+55 |
| ÷ | Hi Cone Fuel 345 gals. 260 gals |
| | Post briefing to T/O |
| | Pilot prebreath 0050L |
| * | Pilot to Acft 0115L |
| | Flight package to Acft 0145L |
| | Take Off 0200L |
| | NOTE: In addition to the confusion which occured in upsetting our flight |
| i | planning schedule, the following could have had adverse effects on the mission: |
| | 1. Recheck of flight plans was pushed |
| | 2. Celestial not completed |
| | 3. Pilot Briefing delayed |
| | 4. Pre-breathing delayed |
| | 5. Preparation of flight packages delayed and done hurriedly |
| | 6. A delayed T/O would have reduced coverage S |
| | airborne at 2400L - Bravo and Coco would probably have been launched before |
| | getting Approved For Release 2003/01/24: CIA-RDP74B00776R000100130033-0 |

There are a few foots which were learned Concerning the operational mission that will he discussed briefly apart from the rest of The report due to The sensitivity of the information: may thornton was quite concerned over the hunter of gentle jusest at the binging for STAT the minorin which was held at there were cours from the B-47, his tanks, the article, and the entire kc-135 crew plus a very large stoff. The only way in which we might be offerted is the colditional hunter of fermed who became moule zealle of the repulsing capability of the article. The B-47 was intercepted and abouted so accordence with briefed instruction. The prise of the article was recalled and asknowledged but went about and flew out the mission. He was not intercapted in so appoint of first mew one at least encountered, - He mission was apparently a simultaneous effort involving one RB-47 gampres with precion ELTAT equipment one the article flying tracks dringed for a

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The activities of his office too not presented a challenge due to the size of the writ and the number of transactions and it is of violen that he is coughly of Considerably more activity.